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SECTION 9-307(1) OF THE U.C.C.: THE SCOPE OF THE
PROTECTION GIVEN A BUYER IN ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS
In Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code a rule of priority
for secured parties and buyers in ordinary course of business is set forth. This
rule is designed to determine the conflicting interests of these parties follow-
ing an unauthorized sale of secured collateral by a debtor. The section pro-
vides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Sec-
tion 1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a person
engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence. (Emphasis added.)
Since a "buyer in ordinary course of business" is one who buys "from a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind,'"- the section applies pri-
marily to sales from inventory. 2
 Usually three parties are involved; a secured
party, a debtor-merchant, and a buyer in ordinary course of business. In
such a situation the security interest is cut off by the operation of section
9-307(1) if the debtor-merchant sells the goods to a "buyer in ordinary course
of business." The addition of a fourth party in one case, and a questionable
degree of buyer knowledge of existing ownership rights in another, recently
have presented two courts with significant issues concerning the application
and interpretation of section 9-307(1).
In National Shawmut Bank v. Jones,3 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court was called upon to decide what effect the addition of a fourth party
has on the applicability of section 9-307(1). In Jones a four-party (as opposed
to the usual three-party) situation was presented wherein a consumer-debtor
holding goods subject to a prior security interest sold them to a merchant,
who in turn sold the goods to a "buyer in ordinary course of business." The
court thus had to determine whether a "buyer in ordinary course of business"
in such a four-party situation would take free of the outstanding security
interest under section 9-307(1), in view of the section's specific requirement
that for the buyer to take free, the security interest must have been "created
by his seller."
A "buyer in ordinary course of business" must buy "without knowledge
that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest
of a third party in the goods."4
 However, under section 9-307(1), such a
buyer will take free of a security interest created by his seller "even though
the buyer knows of its existence." In Cash Loan Co. v. Boser, 5
 the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the interplay of these "knowl-
1 U.C.C.	 1-201(9). All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the
1962 Official Text unless otherwise indicated.
2 See U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2.
8 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967).
4 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
5 34 Wis. 2d 410, 149 N.W.2d 605 (1967).
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edge" provisions in order to find what "knowledge" is sufficient to result in
a denial to a buyer of the protection of section 9-307(1). It is the purpose of
this comment to examine the restriction on the applicability of section
9-307 (1) to security interests "created by his seller," and the "knowledge"
requirements of a buyer who seeks protection under this section, in light of
the Code's policy toward the "buyer in ordinary course of business."
I. THE APPLICATION OF THE "CREATED BY HIS SELLER" LIMITATION TO
FOUR-PARTY SITUATIONS.
In the Jones° case the plaintiff, National Shawmut Bank, held a purchase-
money security interest? in an automobile purchased by one Wever "for per-
sonal family or household purposes" 8 from the Wentworth Motor Company,
Incorporated. This security interest was perfected by the plaintiff through
timely filing9 with the town clerk of Hampton, New Hampshire, wherein
Wever made his residence. Sometime after the filing, Wever, without the
plaintiff's consent, sold or traded the car to Hanson Rock, Incorporated of
Hampton, an automobile dealer in the business of selling new and used cars
to the public. Subsequently the defendant Jones purchased the car from
Hanson Rock for good and sufficient consideration.' 9 At the time of the pur-
chase Jones acted in good faith and with no actual knowledge of any outstand-
ing security interest in the car." Though neither Jones nor the local bank
from which he borrowed the money for the purchase price searched the files
in the town clerk's office, it was agreed at argument of the case that the plain-
tiff's interest could be found only if the search was made under Wever's
name or through an examination of all entries covering automobiles for the
serial number of the vehicle in question.' 2 Sometime after Jones purchased the
6 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967).
7 U.C.C. § 9-107 states:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that
it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or
the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
' 108 N.H. at 387, 236 A.2d at 485.
9 Id. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (d) provides:
(1)A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests
except the following:
. .	 .
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing
is required for a fixture under Section 9-313 or for a motor vehicle
required to be licensed ... .
U.C.C. § 9-301(2) allows the secured party a ten-day grace period in which to file
his purchase-money security interest. In this case, National Shawmut filed nine days
following the sales to Wever, and thus its security interest "relates back" and is per-
fected as of the date of the sale to Wever.
10 108 N.H. at 387, 236 A.2d at 485.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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automobile, Wever defaulted on his obligation, and the plaintiff brought an
action of replevin.
The court had to determine if Jones was a "buyer in ordinary course
of business" and, if so, whether he took free of the security interest created by
the consumer, Wever. In the Code a "buyer in ordinary course of business"
is defined as "a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale
to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third
party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker." 13 The court
found that Jones qualified as a "buyer in ordinary course of business," yet
held that he did not take free of the plaintiff's security interest under section
9-307 (1) because that interest had been created by Wever, and not by his
seller, Hanson Rock.' 4 The court found, in addition, that Jones was not pro-
tected under section 9-307(2),' 5 since the secured party had filed a financing
13 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
14 For a proposal to amend section 9-307(1) by deleting the language "created by
his seller" in order to reverse the result that obtains from application of the Code to
the Jones-type situation, see Vernon, Priorities, The Uniform Commercial Code and
Consumer Financing, 4 B.C. Ind, & Corn. L. Rev. 531, 536 (1963); see also W. Willier
& F. Hart, Uniform Commercial Code Reporter-Digest 24046 to-1048 (1967).
15 Section 9-307(2) provides in part:
In the case of consumer goods . . , a buyer takes free of a security
interest even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security
interest, for value and for his own personal, family or household purposes .. .
unless prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement
covering such goods.
In U.C.C. § 9-109(1), consumer goods are defined as those which are "used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." From this definition it
is unclear whether section 9-307(2) is restricted in its application to sales wherein one
consumer is selling directly to another. This question, in terms of the relationship
between the two subsections of section 9-307, becomes one of whether a buyer in
ordinary course of business is restricted to section 9-307(1) for his protection. Several
writers who have considered this question have concluded that a "buyer in ordinary
course of business" is so restricted; i.e., when section 9-307(1) applies, it does so to
the exclusion of section 9-307(2). See, e.g., 2 P. Coogan, W. Hogan & D. Vagts, Secured
Transactions Under the U.C.C. § 19.02{31[c] (1966); Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72
Harv. L. Rev. 838, 848 (1959) ; Vernon, supra note 14, at 535; Comment, Protection of
a Buyer at an Execution Sale Under U.C.C. Section 9-307, 9 B.C. Ind. & Com, L. Rev. 97,
104 (1967). This conclusion seems to be supported by the construction of the section
itself. The introductory phrase "Mn the case of consumer goods" is followed later
in the section by a specific statement of the requirement that the buyer buy "for his
own personal, family or household purposes." Consequently, if the introductory phrase
does not embody the idea that the goods must be "consumer goods" in the hands of
the seller it would appear to be mere surplusage and add nothing to the definition of
the scope of the section's application. This argument is even more clear when applied
to a restatement of the rule of § 9-307(2) found in official comment 3 accompany-
ing that section. "Under subsection (2) a buyer of consumer goods or farm equipment
takes free of a security interest even though perfected a) if he buys without knowledge of
the security interest, b) for value, c) for his own personal, family, or household pur-
poses." (Emphasis added.) Goods purchased for "personal, family, or household purposes"
are consumer goods under U.C.C. § 9-109 and consequently the only meaningful inter-
pretation of "a buyer of consumer goods" in the comment is that the goods must be
consumer goods before he buys them, i.e., in the hands of the seller. This interpretation
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statement prior to Jones' purchase. Since he did not qualify under either of
these provisions of Article 9, which permit a buyer of goods to take free of a
perfected security interest, judgment was rendered against Jones for $1,-
490.17, the amount outstanding under the plaintiff's security agreement with
Wever.' 6
In applying section 9-307(1) to the Jones case, the court could reach but
one decision. As Weyer was not a dealer, Hanson Rock, his vendee, was not
a "buyer in ordinary course of business." Consequently, section 9-307(1)
did not operate to cut off the bank's interest. When Hanson Rock subse-
quently sold to Jones it had only its encumbered title to convey. Furthermore,
as the applicable security interest was not "created by his seller," section
9-307(1) could not operate to permit Jones to take free of the hank's interest.
In view of the history" and language of section 9-307(1) it is quite ap-
parent that the section was intended to protect directly the "buyer in ordinary
course of business" only in the three.party situation. If four or more parties
are involved, the final party in the chain, even though a "buyer in ordinary
course of business," will not be asserting priority over a security interest
"created by his seller," and consequently he will be unable to take direct ad-
vantage of section 9-307(1). Thus, a secured party who takes and files an
interest in goods held by a consumer is given priority over all subsequent
of § 9-307(2) is also compatible with its counterpart, § 9-307(1), The classes of goods in
the Code are mutually exclusive, and thus the same goods cannot be both inventory
and consumer goods to the same person at the same time. U.C.C. § 9-109, Comment 2,
Section 9-307(1) was specifically designed to determine the rights and liabilities of the
buyer where he buys from inventory. In the 1952 Official Draft the section began
"filn the case of inventory." In the 1956 Recommendation of the Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code the reason given for the deletion of this opening lan-
guage was that "the definition of 'buyer in ordinary course of business' limits subsection
(1) to inventory cases." American Law Institute and National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code 284 (1957). Thus, it would appear that 1 9-307(1)
should control, to the exclusion of § 9-307(2), in a transaction involving a buyer in
ordinary course of business. See Everett Nat'l Bank v. Deichuiteneer, 244 A.2d 196 (N.H.
1968).
se Though the action was brought in replevin to recover possession of the auto-
mobile, Jones' motion for custody was granted upon his filing of a bond in the amount of
$2000 to secure payment of any judgment which might be rendered against him. 108 N.H.
at 387, 236 A.2d at 485. The general rule is that "a security interest contirpTes in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor." U.C.C.
§ 9-306(2).
11 The phrase "created by his seller" was inserted in § 9-307(1) when the section
was revised in 1957. In the 1952 Official Draft the section provided:
In the case of inventory, and in the case of other goods as to which the
secured party files a financing statement in which he claims a security interest
in proceeds, a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a security
interest even though perfected and even though the buyer knows of the terms of
the security agreement.
Though this statement of § 9-307(I) does not expressly limit the protection of the buyer
in ordinary course to those security interests "created by his seller," the comments
which accompanied this draft of the section indicate that such a limitation was intended.
U.C.C. § 9-307(1), Comment 2, of the 1952 Official Draft provides: "Under subsection
(1) a buyer in ordinary course of business . , . takes free of a perfected security interest
in goods . , when the goods are inventory of the debtor . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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purchasers following an unauthorized sale by the consumer-debtor," includ-
ing a "buyer in ordinary course of business" such as Jones. In both the typi-
cal three-party situation and the four-party situation of the Jones case, the
final purchasers are "buyers in the ordinary course of business." Yet in the
former situation the buyer is protected, while in the latter he is not. In view
of the underlying policy of the Code this apparent anomaly deserves closer
examination, both from the standpoint of the "buyer in ordinary course of
business" and that of the secured party.
It should be noted that the Jones result is predicated on the goods hav-
ing been initially encumbered by a consumer-debtor. Should the goods be
initially encumbered by a dealer who holds them as inventory, a contrary re-
sult obtains under the Code in a four-party situation such as that found in
Jones. In a hypothetical situation, a secured party takes a security interest in
the inventory of a dealer. The secured party files a financing statement, thus
perfecting his interest." The debtor-dealer then sells the goods to another
dealer in goods of that kind, who in turn sells the goods to a "buyer in
ordinary course of business," who holds the goods in the capacity of a con-
sumer. Viewing the overall transaction as of the time of the first sale, the
dealer who purchased the goods from the debtor-dealer will take free of the
security interest by operation of section 9-307 (1), as he is a "buyer in
ordinary course of business" and the security interest was "created by his
seller." However, viewing the overall transaction as of the time of the second
sale, section 9-307(1) would not appear to allow the consumer-buyer to
take free since the security interest was not "created by his seller." 2 °
If, however, the secured party is able to enforce his security interest
against the consumer-buyer, a conflict with other provisions in the Code
would result. The Code provides in Article 2 that " [a] purchaser of goods
acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer . . . ." 2 '
As previously stated, following the first sale, the dealer-buyer would have title
in the goods "free" of the secured party's interest by operation of section
9-307(t). When the dealer in turn sells to a consumer-buyer, the buyer takes
"all title which his transferor had" and thus would also take title free of the
secured party's interest. 22
It is thus apparent that the result in the Jones case would have been
otherwise had the party who created the security interest been a dealer
rather than a consumer. In both cases the ultimate buyer purchased from a
18 See U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 3; 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property 550-51 (1965).
19 See U.C.C. § 9-302.
20 Coogan, A Suggested Analytical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1,25 (1963).
21 U.C.C. § 2-403(1). 	 •
22 It should be noted that the application of Article 2 in this analysis is not
violative of U.C.C. § 2-402(3). That section in part provides: "Nothing in this Article
shall be deemed to impair the rights of creditors of the seller (a) under the provisions of
the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9). . ." The section refers only to "credi-
tors of the seller," whereas in this analysis Article 2 is applied only to the second sale, i.e.,
from the dealer to the consumer-buyer. As the secured party is not a creditor of the
seller in this sale, application of Article 2 provisions does not "impair the rights of
creditors of the seller."
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dealer, yet whether or not he took free of the security interest was determined
by the status of his seller's transferor, a party with whom he had not dealt.
As a consequence of the possibility that the party from whom his seller pur-
chased was a consumer who had encumbered the goods, the "buyer in ordinary
course of business" must search the title to the goods and the files. Only
through such a search can he reasonably be assured that he will take the goods
free of a possible outstanding security interest. 23
 The buyer's alternative,
assuming that he does not wish to undertake a search of the title and files, is
to evaluate his seller's financial position in order that he may reasonably be
assured of recovering against his seller for breach of warranty of title"
should a secured party subsequently enforce his interest through an action of
replevin or for conversion. 25
It should be noted that this necessity of a search of the files and title by a
"buyer in ordinary course of business" is not limited to a four-party situation,
even though a "buyer in ordinary course of business" in a three-party situa-
tion takes free automatically by virtue of section 9-307(1). This is demon-
strated by the fact that any buyer must first search the title and files before
he can reasonably be assured that there is no outstanding encumbrance created
by one not his seller, and thus that he is in fact in a three-party situation.
Therefore, even in those situations where section 9-307 (1) would operate to
allow the "buyer in ordinary course of business" to take free, the buyer cannot
be certain that the section will apply without a search of the title and files.
This necessity to ascertain whether someone has encumbered the goods
prior to their purchase by the buyer's immediate seller would appear to
operate contrary to the Code's policy toward the "buyer in ordinary course
of business." It is one of the basic objectives of the Code to promote and
facilitate the free flow of commerce in goods. 24 This policy favoring the free
23 Other provisions of the Code make possible a situation wherein even this pro-
cedure will not enable the buyer to learn of security interests in the goods which may
be enforceable against him. Under the Code a purchase-money security interest in con-
sumer goods need not be filed to be perfected. U.C.C. i 9-302(1) (d). In a hypothetical
situation, B purchases a television set and borrows the purchase price from A, who
takes a purchase-money security interest in the set. A does not file. B then, in violation
of his agreement with A, sells the set to C, a dealer in television sets. C then sells the
set to D, a "buyer in ordinary course of business." D would not take free under
5 9-307(1) because the security interest was not created by his seller. Nor would D take
free under § 9-307(2), for that section applies only to sales wherein one consumer sells to
another consumer. See note 15 supra. The result is somewhat anomalous in view of the
fact that had D purchased directly from B he would have taken free under § 9-307(2).
D, furthermore, is virtually incapable of protecting himself in this situation. His only
mode of discovering the security interest, since there has been no filing, is to inquire of
B as to any encumbrances on the set. It would appear highly unlikely that B, who has
violated his agreement with A, is going to be any more honest with D.
24 U.C.C. § 2 -312.
25 See U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 3; 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 551.
28 See Kennedy, Secured Lending Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 83 Banking
L.J. 283, 285 (1966). Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 493 (1963). The Special Committee on the
Uniform Commercial Code of Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc.,
in reporting to the New York Law Revision Commission, specifically approved "[t]he
policy of the free movement of goods expressed in Section 9-307(1). . . ." 2 New York Law
Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 1018 (1954).
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movement of goods is reflected in the entrusting provisions of Article 2 and
section 9-307(1), which are designed to operate concurrently as "a single
principle protecting persons who buy in ordinary course out of inventory." 27
As regards Article 9 specifically, this policy is preserved by protecting a
security interest created under that Article "as long as it does not interfere
with the normal flow of commerce." 28 However, by providing that a "buyer in
ordinary course of business" takes free of a perfected security interest
created by his seller, section 9-307(1) is indicative of a determination by
the draftsmen that priority must be granted such buyers in order to preserve
the normal flow of commerce.
This policy benefits both the secured party and the debtor in that it
facilitates the conversion of the collateral to cash and thus payment of the
debt. However, the limitation of section 9-307(1) protection to security in-
terests created by the seller leads to an apparent internal inconsistency in the
section in that it would appear to restrict, rather than promote, the free flow
of goods by forcing the "buyer in ordinary course" (even in a three-party
situation) to undertake a search of the title and files for possible security
interests created by one not his seller.
An examination of section 9-307(1) would appear to indicate that the
draftsmen intended that the prospective purchaser could rely for his protec-
tion upon his status as a "buyer in ordinary course of business," and not upon
his ability to search the title and files. Section 9-307(1) provides that "[a]
buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a security interest
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even
though the buyer knows of its existence." (Emphasis added.) A "buyer in
ordinary course," furthermore, must buy in good faith and without knowledge
that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest
of a third party. 28 When these two provisions are read together, "it results
that the buyer takes free if he merely knows that there is a security interest
which covers the goods but takes subject if he knows, in addition, that the
sale is in violation of some term in the security agreement not waived by the
words or conduct of the secured party." 3°
From this it is apparent that a "buyer in ordinary course of business"
who has no knowledge of a security interest created by his seller has no duty
or reason to search the files to ascertain whether one does in fact exist. This
results because section 9-307(1) "protects" such a buyer even if he knows of
the existence of the security interest. However, due to the "created by his
seller" limitation the "buyer in ordinary course" must follow a somewhat
anomalous procedure in order to protect himself. He must search the title and
files for all possible security interests created by one not his seller. Yet as to
his seller, the buyer not only need not check the files to be protected, but in
fact he is encouraged not to do so. If the secured party has filed the security
27 U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 2.
28 Lee, Perfection and Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo.
L.J. 1, 34 (1962) ; see also Project, California Chattel Security and Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 806, 898 (1961).
29 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2.
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agreement in place of or along with the financing statement,31 the buyer, by
checking the files under the name of his seller, could obtain knowledge that
the sale is in violation of the security interest of the secured party and thus
lose the protection of section 9-307(1).
The "buyer in ordinary course of business" would appear to be con-
cerned primarily with the price, quality and condition of the goods. For all
of these aspects of his purchase he can look to his seller. Furthermore, no
matter from whom the seller purchased the goods, to the "buyer in ordinary
course of business" they are simply inventory. Yet due to the "created by
his seller" limitation it is very relevant who transferred the goods to his seller.
If it had been a dealer, then the "buyer in ordinary course of business" will
take free of any security interest created by his seller's transferor, on the
assumption that his seller took free under section 9-307(1). However, if his
seller's transferor had been a consumer, then the "buyer in ordinary course
of business" will take subject to any security interest he created. This distinc-
tion based upon the nature of his seller's transferor would appear to be arbi-
trary from the viewpoint of the "buyer in ordinary course of business." If the
phrase "created by his seller" were deleted from section 9-307 (1) this distinc-
tion would no longer be made, and any restriction on the free flow of goods
that results from the buyer being forced to search the files and title would be
eliminated. Before such a change in the scope of the protection given a "buyer
in ordinary course of business" can be proposed, however, the "created by his
seller" limitation must also be appraised from the viewpoint of the secured
party.
A security interest, by its very nature, secures the Loan extended by the
secured party and thus reduces the risk that the lender must assume. Should
the debtor default on his obligation, the secured party may repossess the goods
and satisfy his claim out of the proceeds of their sale. 32
 Furthermore, should
the debtor sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, to the extent that the
security interest "continues"33
 in the goods, the lender's risk is reduced. These
attributes of a security interest undoubtedly serve as a great incentive to the
release of credit by money lenders. With an economy that is highly dependent
on credit buying, such an incentive would appear desirable. However, the
desire to realize these favorable effects of enforceable security interests must
also be reconciled with the desire to protect innocent purchasers from the
debtor.
Under the Code, the protection afforded a security interest against sale
by the debtor is determined by the nature of the debtor. Whereas in a four-
party situation it would appear unimportant to the "buyer in ordinary course
of business" whether his seller's transferor was a consumer or a dealer, to the
secured party the nature of the debtor is of primary importance. If the debtor
is a dealer, then the secured party "expects" that the debtor will sell the collat-
eral to buyers in ordinary course of business. Consequently, the principle em-
bodied in section 9-307(1) that buyers from such debtors take free of the
security interest is not considered by the Code draftsmen to be violative of
81 See U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 1.
32 U.C.C. §§ 9-503, -504.
33 U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
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the interests of consignors or lenders who hold a security interest in the inven-
tory, "since the very purpose of goods in inventory is to be turned into cash by
sale."34
 On the other hand, if the debtor holds the goods as consumer goods, the
secured party would not generally expect the debtor to sell them until the debt
had been satisfied. Thus, the secured party may protect his interest against sub-
sequent purchasers and creditors should the debtor fraudulently sell or further
encumber the goods by prohibiting sale in the security agreement and filing. As
seen by the Jones case, in which the debtor was a consumer, the "created by
his seller" limitation in section 9-307 (1) even protects such a security interest
against a sale by the debtor's vendee to a "buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness." Yet because this limitation seems inconsistent with the overall policy
of the Code toward the "buyer in ordinary course of business," by forcing
him to search the title and files, the effect of its removal upon the secured
party should be examined.
With the deletion of the language "created by his seller," a secured party
would be required to enforce his possessory rights in the collateral prior to
its sale to a "buyer in ordinary course of business" or else lose them. There-
fore, in order to protect his security interest from loss through a sale to a
"buyer in ordinary course of business," the secured party would be required
to make periodic checks on his collateral to make sure his debtor had not sold
the goods to a dealer."' Of course, the secured party could decline to check on
who holds his collateral and rely upon a suit for conversion against each
purchaser of the goods prior to a sale to a "buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness."34
Forcing the secured party to protect his security interest by maintain-
ing knowledge of the whereabouts of his collateral, however, would be a sig-
nificant departure from the present situation wherein the secured party need
locate the collateral only upon default by the debtor in his payments. Yet
there are provisions in the Code which support the proposition that certain
situations do warrant the imposition of affirmative duties on the secured party
to maintain knowledge of the whereabouts of his collateral. Where the secured
party is required to file in the county wherein the debtor resides, the filing be-
comes ineffective four months after the debtor moves to a new county unless
the second party files in the new county." Similarly, if goods subject to a
perfected security interest are moved to another state from that wherein the
security interest attached, the security interest becomes unperfected after four
months unless the secured party perfects by refiling in the new state." In
light of these provisions, deletion of the words "created by his seller" would
not appear to be violative of any overall Code policy against forcing the
secured party to maintain a check on his collateral.
By deleting "created by his seller" from section 9 -307(1), the risk of
34 U.C.C. 2-403, Comment 2.
55 An unauthorized sale of the collateral by the debtor to a dealer would consti-
tute default on the part of the debtor, see U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 3, and the secured
party could repossess the collateral from the dealer. U.C.C. § 9-503.
36 See U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 3; 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 550-51. See also
U.G.I. v. McFalls, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 713 (Lancaster County Ct. 1959).
37 U.C.C. § 9-401, Alternative Subsection (3).
38 U.C.C. § 9-103(3).
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loss of his security interest in consumer goods through a sale to 'a "buyer in
ordinary course of business" would be placed upon the secured party. It is
reasonable to assume that this risk will be passed on to debtors by money
lenders in the form of an increase in the cost of consumer credit. However,
this result would appear more equitable in that it spreads such economic
losses among the entire class of consumer borrowers, rather than imposing the
entire loss on a single party who may be totally unable to protect himself. Yet
this does not mean that the consumer class as a whole will not benefit from
such a change in the protection given a "buyer in ordinary course of business."
The losses presently being incurred by such buyers may possibly be eliminated
through a minimum of effort and expense on the part of secured parties. One
method by which a secured party may prevent the loss of his security interest
through a sale to a "buyer in ordinary course of business" is a more selective
screening of applicants for credit. Furthermore, he may conduct selective
periodic investigations concerning the whereabouts of his collateral, giving
greater attention to those debtors who are poor risks and have great outstand-
ing indebtedness.
II. THE KNOWLEDGE CRITERIA FOR BUYING IN ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS.
As noted above, a "buyer in ordinary course of business" takes free
under section 9-307(1) "if he merely knows that there is a security interest
which covers the goods but takes subject if he knows, in addition, that the
sale is in violation of some term in the security agreement not waived by the
words or conduct of the secured party." 39
 The effect of this apparent dis-
tinction was considered in the recent case of Cash Loan Co. v. Boser, 4° in
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a
buyer's knowledge would bar him from the protection of section 9-307(1).
Cash Loan held a security interest in a roto drill which was unperfected
due to a lack of filing. The defendant, Boser, purchased the drill from one
Bembinster, who had possession of the machine on consignment to sell it
for Neuheisel, Cash Loan's debtor. The court accepted the lower court's find-
ing that Bembinster had not purchased the drill from Neuheisel. Prior to
purchasing the drill, Boser had been told by representatives of Cash Loan
that it held a chattel mortgage in the drill. Sometime after Baser purchased
the chattel, Cash Loan brought an action of replevin. The primary question
was framed by the court in terms of "whether the fact that Boser had actual
knowledge of Cash Loan's mortgage precludes him from claiming priority
even though the mortgage was unperfected . . "41
 The court rendered judge-
ment for the plaintiff on the basis that "Boser here was put on notice by
statements of the representatives of Cash Loan that he would be violating the
ownership rights of Cash Loans if he purchased the roto drill from Bembin-
ster; hence he cannot be considered a 'buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness ,....),42
89
	 § 9-307, Comment 2.
40 34 Wis. 2d 410, 149 N.W.2d 605 (1967).
41 Id. at 417-18, 149 N.W.2d at 609.
42 Id. at 419, 149 N.W.2d at 610.
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It is critical to note that the court's holding that Boser was not a "buyer
in ordinary course of business" was based upon a finding that he knew of the
security interest and thus had notice that he would be violating Cash Loan's
ownership rights by purchasing the drill. Due to the interplay of the Code's
definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" and section 9-307(1),
however, a buyer is disqualified from protection under section 9-307(1) only
if he knows that the sale is in violation of the secured party's interest. The
court, therefore, appears to have equivocated "notice" and "knowledge" for
purposes of the definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business."
However, these terms are specifically defined and distinguished in the
Code. "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual
knowledge of it."" On the other hand, a person has "notice" of a fact when
he has actual knowledge of it, or should have known of it from all the facts
and circumstances." Due to the far more extensive coverage of the definition
of notice, the unqualified use of the term "without knowledge" in the defini-
tion of "buyer in ordinary course of business" must be taken to exclude
situations wherein the buyer has anything less than actual knowledge that
the sale is violative of the security interest of the secured party.
Due to the fact that under the Code "notice" does include "actual
knowledge," however, it is arguable that the court meant that the buyer
had "actual knowledge" that the sale to him was violative of the secured
party's rights when it stated that he had "notice" of that fact. However,
further statements by the court would appear to indicate that the buyer's
notice consisted of something less than actual knowledge of the violative
nature of the sale. The court stated that "[i]f the defendant did not believe
Cash Loan's claim that it had a prior mortgage, he could have requested
production of the document by Cash Loan."" This statement indicates that
the court felt that the only actual knowledge the buyer had was that the
plaintiff "had a prior mortgage" and not that the buyer had knowledge
that the sale was in violation of the plaintiff's rights.
The above statement is also indicative of a feeling by the court that a
buyer who knows of the existence of a security interest in the goods has a
duty to check the security agreement for terms prohibiting the sale. How-
ever, such a conclusion would appear contrary to the entire thrust and
purpose of section 9-307(1). The section is applicable only where there is
an unauthorized sale by the debtor," for if the secured party authorizes the
sale in the security agreement or otherwise the buyer takes free irrespective
of the terms in the security agreement. 47 With this restriction on the applica-
tion of the section in mind, an interpretation that the buyer has the burden
of examining the security agreement for terms prohibiting the sale would
render meaningless the phrase "even though the buyer knows of its existence"
in section 9-307(1). This follows because, under the court's reasoning in
Boser, if the sale violated some term in the security agreement, all buyers
45 U.C.C. § 1 -201(25).
44 Id .
415 34 Wis. 2d at 420, 149 N.W.2d at 610.
46 U.C.C. § 9-347, Comment 2.
47 U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 3.
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who knew of the existence of the security interest would also be presumed to
"know" that the sale violated the security interest, and thus would take
subject to the interest. Consequently, the section would never protect a
"buyer in ordinary course of business" who knew of the existence of the
security interest prior to his purchase.
From this interpretation it is clear that the Code has expressly provided
that a "buyer in ordinary course of business" has no duty to examine the
security agreement even if he knows that his seller has encumbered the goods.
This determination by the Code draftsmen would appear to conform, in
most instances, to the intentions of the parties. One who extends credit on
the inventory of a dealer generally expects that the inventory will be sold
to repay the loan.48
 One who buys from the dealer, therefore, should be able
to rely upon his authority to sell.
III. SUGGESTED AMENDMENT AND INTERPRETATION.
Due to the fact that the protection afforded a "buyer in ordinary course
of business" under section 9-307(1) is limited to those security interests
"created by his seller," the buyer must search the title and files for possible
security interests created by one not his seller. This would appear to contra-
dict the Code's overall policy toward the "buyer in ordinary course of
business" as embodied in section 9-307(1), for as to his own seller such a
buyer is protected irrespective of whether he searches the title or files. To
eliminate this apparent inconsistency, it is suggested that section 9-307(1)
be amended by deleting the words "created by his seller." 4° With such a
change, a buyer in ordinary course would take free no matter who created
the security interest, and the Code would truly set forth "a single principle
protecting persons who buy in ordinary course out of inventory." 50 In addi-
tion, the Code's underlying objective of promoting the free flow of goods
would be promoted, for as to any possible security interest in the goods the
buyer could rely upon his status as a "buyer in ordinary course of business"
for his protection. Such a change would place an extra burden upon secured
parties, yet it would not be an undue burden in light of the fact that such
parties are paid to assume a risk of default by the debtor and should be
able to protect their interests sufficiently by a minimum amount of policing.
Furthermore, in light of the construction of section 9-307(1), courts
should insist upon a finding of whether the buyer had "actual knowledge"
that the sale was in violation of the security interest of a third party before
48 See U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 2.
" One commentary appears to ignore the words "created by his seller" and con-
tends that the present formulation of § 9-307(1) would protect a "buyer in ordinary
course of business" from a perfected but unfiled security interest which was created by his
seller's transferor. Wiseman & King, Perfection, Filing and Forms Under Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 Wayne L. Rev. 580, 590-91 & n.37 (1963). See also
Al Maroone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto Auction, Inc., 205 Pa. Super. 154, 208 A.2d 290
(1965), in which a consumer-debtor sold a car to the defendant auto auction. At the
time the secured party brought suit the defendant had already sold the car. The court,
in finding for the plaintiff, stated by way of dicta that a buyer in the ordinary course
from the defendant dealer would take free of the security interest. Id. at 160, 208 A.2d
at 293.
50 U.C.C. § 2-403, Comment 2.
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denying a buyer protection under the section on the basis of the knowledge
he possessed at the time he purchased. Section 9-307 (1) places no affirmative
duty upon the buyer to examine the terms of the security agreement cover-
ing a security interest created by his seller, and expressly provides that a
buyer who does not know that the sale violates such a security interest shall
take free. Should a buyer with knowledge of a security interest created by
his seller be forced by such a "notice" concept as envisioned in Boser to trace
and examine the security agreement, the free flow of goods which the Code
is designed to achieve could be severely restricted. 51 Furthermore, such
precautionary action by the buyer would in most instances prove to be
unnecessary, for generally a debtor-dealer is given authority to sell the
secured inventory by the secured party. By purchasing from such a debtor,
the "buyer in ordinary course of business" performs the necessary function
of converting the inventory to cash and thus enables the debtor to repay
the secured party. To encourage and promote his performance of this func-
tion, the "buyer in ordinary course of business" should be protected in his
purchase when he has less than actual knowledge that the sale violates the
ownership rights of a third party. When he has such knowledge, he is justly
denied protection.
THOMAS J. SEXTON
61 See Warren, supra note 26, at 472-73.
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